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Political scientists have developed increasingly sophisticated understandings of the influences on Supreme Court
decision making. Yet, much less attention has been paid to empirical measures of the Court’s ideological output.
We develop a theory of the interactions between rational litigants, lower court judges, and Supreme Court justices.
We argue that the most common measure of the Supreme Court’s ideological output—whether the Court’s decision
is liberal or conservative—suffers from systematic bias. We trace this bias empirically and explain the undesirable
consequences it has for empirical analyses of judicial behavior. Specifically, we show that, although the Court’s
preferences are positively correlated with the ideological direction of the justices’ decision to reverse a lower court,
the attitudes of the justices are negatively related—and significantly so—to the ideological direction of outcomes that
affirm lower court decisions. We also offer a solution that allows scholars to work around this ‘‘affirmance bias.’’
O
ver the last 50 years, political scientists and
legal scholars have developed increasingly
sophisticated models of judicial decision mak-
ing, particularly for the U.S. Supreme Court. Scholars
have demonstrated that a host of forces—including
legal considerations (e.g., Richards and Kritzer 2002),
the political preferences of justices (e.g., Rohde and
Spaeth 1976; Schubert 1965; Segal and Spaeth 2002),
strategic considerations arising from the relation-
ships between the justices and between the Court and
other policy makers (e.g., Epstein and Knight 1998;
Eskridge 1991; Maltzman, Spriggs, and Wahlbeck
2000; Stearns 2002; Whittington 2005), and contex-
tual factors such as organized interests and public
opinion (e.g., Collins 2004; McGuire and Stimson
2005)—shape the outputs of the Supreme Court.
Ironically, the measure of policy content utilized in
such analyses has not been scrutinized as closely.
In studying the Court’s outputs, scholars are
typically interested in the rationale or rule that the
Court offers to justify its judgment; after all, it is the
justification that embodies the ‘‘policy content’’ of an
opinion. Since this policy is encapsulated in lengthy
prose and technical legal language, developing reli-
able and valid measures of ‘‘the law’’ created by the
Court poses challenges. To deal with these difficulties,
researchers have commonly used the ideological
direction of the Court’s judgment, liberal or con-
servative, as a proxy for the rationale of the decision,
using the legal issue and the identity of the party that
prevailed to assess whether the justices favored the
liberal or conservative side in a dispute. In other
words, the ideological tenor of the underlying rule
(difficult to measure) has traditionally been approxi-
mated by the ideological direction of the judgment in
the case (easier to measure).1
In this paper, we evaluate this measure critically.
Central to our argument is that the ideological
direction of the Court’s judgment and the content
of the underlying rule may, but need not, coincide.
As we show in the next section, discrepancies between
the ideological direction of the judgment in a deci-
sion and the ideological content of the opinion’s ra-
tionale are not random but a predictable consequence
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1This is the convention followed in the U.S. Supreme Court Judicial Database, which provides a series of protocols for coding the
ideological direction of decisions. Although there can be disagreements about the ideological direction in some cases (Harvey 2006), one
advantage of this approach is that it is considerably more reliable than trying to estimate the policy content of a decision.
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of the strategic interactions among lower court
judges, litigants, and Supreme Court justices. As a
result, measures of the content of judicial decisions
that rely on coding the direction of outcomes are
likely to be biased in a systematic way. After present-
ing our theoretical argument, we demonstrate that
this bias can be traced empirically, and that it has
significant implications for the inferences that schol-
ars draw in substantive research. We end by propos-
ing a partial solution that continues to rely on the
directional measure—a substantial advantage in light
of the methodological difficulties involved in coding
content—but significantly reduces bias and improves
our ability to draw inferences.
Strategic Litigants, Strategic Judges
Since the earliest quantitative analyses of the Supreme
Court, political scientists have assumed that the
members of the Court vote according to their
preferences in relation to the facts presented in each
case. In the classic formulation, both the justices and
the case facts are arrayed along a single ideological
dimension, and whether a justice votes in a liberal or
conservative direction is simply a function of her
location relative to each case (Schubert 1965). A jus-
tice located to the right of a given case fact will vote
conservatively; a justice to the left, liberally.
Our model of judicial decision making similarly
assumes a one-dimensional ‘‘fact space’’ in which a
case can be represented as a point, x e R (for recent
similar approaches, see Carrubba et al. 2008; Lax and
Cameron 2007). For example, the fact space in search
and seizure cases might represent the intrusiveness of
the search (with searches becoming more intrusive as
we move to the right in the space), and the central
question confronting the justices in any given case is
whether a specific search violates the Fourth Amend-
ment. Cases are then decided by the application of
legal rules that determine which party ought to win
for a given set of case facts. In this simple ‘‘case
space’’ framework, legal rules are most easily repre-
sented by thresholds: Each rule marks out a threshold
along the case-fact continuum such that case facts to
the left of the threshold result in judgment for one
party and those to the right result in judgment for the
other party. To continue our example, consider
Figure 1, which depicts the fact space for searches
along a continuum. A legal rule, denoted by xi, in-
dicates how intrusive a search may be before it be-
comes unconstitutional. Because the search at issue is
located at c,—that is, to the right of this threshold—it
is more intrusive than permitted by this legal rule. As
a result, an opinion that adopts the rule xi would
conclude that the search is unconstitutional.
The preferences of individual justices—whether
induced by policy preferences or by legal consider-
ations—are captured by the most preferred legal rule
that a justice would like to see applied to a particular
case. These legal rules become less attractive to a
justice as they are further removed from her preferred
legal rule. Thus, more conservative judges are moti-
vated to pursue legal rules that allow for more
intrusive searches; more liberal judges are likely to
pursue legal rules that narrow the scope of intrusive
searches. (We assume for the rest of our discussion
that as legal rules move to the right in our fact space,
they become more and more conservative.2)
When drafting an opinion in a case, the Court
expresses a particular legal rule. By doing so, the
Court also resolves the dispute between the two
parties, since the legal rule implies a judgment in
favor of one party. On collegial courts, bargaining
over the content of judicial opinions—that is, the
legal rule—is obviously of central interest. For our
purposes, however, we can remain agnostic on which
justices are particularly influential in shaping opinion
content. What is central for our argument is that
opinions are characterized by a rule, which implies a
judgment, and that political scientists have typically
relied on the direction of the judgment as a proxy for
the ideological content of the rule.
The Supreme Court
As Chief Justice Rehnquist explained, ‘‘[T]he most
common reason members of our Court vote to grant
certiorari is that they doubt the correctness of the
decision of the lower court’’ (1987, 127), a view made
manifest by the consistently high rate at which the
Court has reversed the decisions of those lower courts
whose decisions it reviews. To most political scien-
tists who have studied the Court’s agenda setting,
the criterion by which the justices evaluate that cor-
rectness is ideological, as opposed to strictly legal
(Boucher and Segal 1995). To be sure, in granting
review to a lower court decision, the justices seek to
2This assumption implies that the ‘‘fact space’’ can be ordered in
such a way that rules become more conservative as we move to
the right. As long as there is general agreement on how to view
the underlying issue (e.g., the intrusiveness of searches), this is an
innocuous assumption.
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achieve other ends, as well: most notably, the Court
seeks to resolve conflicts between lower courts
(Ulmer 1984) and tries to fulfill an institutional ob-
ligation to address legal issues of national importance
(Caldeira and Wright 1988). These agenda-setting
objectives, however, are orthogonal to maximizing
the justices’ policy preferences at the merits (Perry
1991, 278). Thus, there is no reason—at least none
of which we are aware—to believe that the Court’s
desire to ensure uniform legal policy on matters of
national consequence is conditional on the justices’
ideological goals; justices of all ideological stripes
want to resolve conflict and address major policy
questions.
Accordingly, we assume for the purposes of our
argument that the Court’s principal motive in select-
ing cases is to correct what is from its perspective an
ideologically incorrect decision; that is, the justices
grant cert because they believe that the legal rule
adopted by the lower court represents a serious de-
viation from the legal rule that a majority of justices
prefer (Supreme Court Assumption 1). We do not ab-
stract away other agenda goals. Instead, we regard
them as stochastic to an ideologically motivated pro-
cess of case selection, a process that is the basis for
our model.
A second salient feature of Supreme Court
decision making is the presence of significant re-
source constraints. The justices can review only a
small number of cases each term. Ceteris paribus, the
Court is therefore more likely to grant plenary review
to a lower court decision that deviates significantly
from its preferred legal rule than one that more
closely approximates it (Boucher and Segal 1995;
Caldeira, Wright, and Zorn 1999; Supreme Court
Assumption 2). In addition, the Court confronts
informational constraints. When deciding whether
to grant review to a case, the justices form an
impression of the appropriateness of the rule em-
bodied in the lower court decision. Their impression
is usually accurate and (given our assumption about
the Court’s uniform interest in error-correction)
results in the reversal of the lower court. On occasion,
though, this impression turns out to be mistaken
when the Court proceeds to decision making on the
merits, in which case the justices end up affirming the
lower court. So, on plenary review, the justices may
discover that the lower court decision is on the
correct side of the Supreme Court’s preferred judg-
ment rather than on the opposite side as initially
perceived (Supreme Court Assumption 3). Finally, we
assume that when deciding a case, the Court sets
policy—expressed in a legal rule—at its most pre-
ferred point, i.e., at the rule threshold on which a
majority of justices can agree (Supreme Court As-
sumption 4). Given the rule adopted by the Court, the
justices also issue a judgment for the party that
prevails under the rule. If the judgment favors the
party that prevailed in the lower court, the justices
affirm the lower court decision; if the other party
wins, the justices reverse the lower court.
To illustrate, consider Figure 2. A lower court has
issued a decision that establishes a legal rule at DLC.
Given the fact pattern c in the case, this rule (and
therefore the lower court decision) results in judg-
ment in favor of one of the parties (say Party A).
Suppose the losing party B favors a more conservative
rule and appeals to the Supreme Court. If the
Supreme Court perceives that DLC is a sufficiently
serious deviation from its preferred rule, it will grant
cert. In issuing its decision, the Court will move the
legal rule rightward to its preferred legal rule, XSC.
Moreover, because the case facts fall below XSC (but
fall above DLC), the Court concludes that Party
B—the petitioner—should have prevailed. Accord-
ingly, it issues a reversal of the lower court decision.
Lower Courts
We assume that lower court judges have normally
distributed preferences over legal rules and that they
would like to write opinions that correspond as
closely as possible to those preferred legal rules
(Lower Court Assumption 1). At the same time, lower
court judges act within a judicial hierarchy and, as
such, are sensitive to the potential costs of being
reversed by the Supreme Court. Among other things,
reversals can damage the professional reputation of a
judge and add to her workload if a case is remanded
FIGURE 1 Legal Rules in a Spatial Model
FIGURE 2 An Illustration
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(Klein and Hume 2003). We therefore assume that,
all things being equal, lower court judges prefer not
to be reversed by the Supreme Court (Lower Court
Assumption 2). Lower court judges therefore engage
in a ‘‘balancing game’’—they must trade-off their
desire to issue decisions they prefer against the need
to follow the Supreme Court to avoid reversal.
Of course, the exercise of this supervisory role is
itself costly to the Supreme Court. So, we assume that
lower court judges anticipate that they have some
room, or ‘‘slack,’’ to deviate from the Supreme
Court’s preferences without being reviewed (Cameron,
Segal, and Songer 2000). Operating in an environment
of uncertainty, lower court judges calculate this slack
by estimating the distance between their preferences
and those of the Court. They then exploit it to write
opinions that more closely reflect their preferences,
bearing in mind that greater deviations increase the
likelihood of Supreme Court review (Lower Court
Assumption 3). Naturally, lower court judges differ in
the intensity of their preference for avoiding Supreme
Court reversal, their estimate of the slack they have,
and the value they place on seeing their own policy
preferences implemented. Consequently, they vary in
how boldly they will deviate from the Supreme
Court’s preferences (Lower Court Assumption 4).
Figure 3 illustrates these assumptions. Consider a
lower court that prefers legal rule XLC , far to the left
of the Supreme Court’s preferred rule of XSC .
Suppose the lower court either believes that it does
not have much slack because the Supreme Court has
abundant resources and is likely to take a case even if
it deviates only slightly from the Court’s preferred
rationale, or it is so concerned about a reversal that it
is unwilling to take a significant chance of review
from the Supreme Court. In either case, the lower
court will choose to stick closely to the Supreme
Court’s preferred rule, by issuing a lower court
decision at, say, DLC . If, instead, the lower court is
bolder—because the threat of a reversal does not
weigh heavily in its calculations or because it believes
that the Court faces severe resource constraints that
prevent it from reviewing even relatively significant
deviations—it might issue a decision that deviates
further, say, at ~DLC .
Litigants
In contemplating an appeal to the U.S. Supreme
Court, potential petitioners consider both the costs of
litigation and their probability of success (Songer,
Cameron, and Segal 1995). We assume, therefore,
that litigants petition for certiorari when they con-
clude that they are likely to succeed on the merits
(Litigant Assumption 1). Thus, a litigant will appeal if
she believes that the legal rule preferred by a majority
of the Supreme Court is on the opposite side of the
lower court judgment as applied to the case facts and
will thus lead to a reversal of the lower court’s
judgment.3
Figure 4 illustrates this assumption. Suppose a
lower court has issued a decision at DLC . The case
facts are located at c, and the lower court has issued a
judgment in favor of one party (say Party A). Party B,
preferring a more conservative legal rule, appeals in
the belief that the Supreme Court shares its policy
orientations and prefers a legal rule at XSC . Assuming
Party B was correct in its estimate, the Court would
grant cert and correct the lower court’s error by
setting policy at XSC . In so doing, it would reverse
what, from the litigant’s perspective, is a liberal
decision by the lower court, and the outcome could
thus be classified as a ‘‘conservative reversal.’’ On the
other hand, suppose Party B believes that the Su-
preme Court’s preferred rule is at ~XSC . By this
estimate, the Court is sympathetic to B’s position in
the sense that it also favors a more conservative legal
rule than the one adopted by the lower court, but the
Supreme Court—being to the left of the case
facts—would still decide the case in favor of Party A.
Party B estimates that it cannot secure a conservative
reversal and therefore chooses not to appeal. (Assum-
ing Party A has prevailed in the lower court, Party B
would not appeal if it believed the Supreme Court’s
preferred rule to be to the left of DLC .)
Note, however, that litigants make this decision
under an informational constraint: while they have
an estimate of where the Supreme Court would likely
set policy (XSC), informed by its recent decisions,
FIGURE 3 Lower Court Decision Making
3Ironically, of course, most petitions—indeed, as of this writing,
at least 80% of petitions—do not satisfy our assumption: the in
forma pauperis petitions are filed largely by the incarcerated, who
for all obvious reasons consider neither the costs of litigating nor
their likelihood of success. The Court has never regarded these
cases as credible candidates for certiorari and, as a percentage of
such cases filed, grants review to virtually none of them. Thus,
like other studies of agenda setting and strategic litigation, we
choose to ignore them (see, e.g., Caldeira and Wright 1988;
Songer, Cameron, and Segal 1995).
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they cannot be sure about the Supreme Court’s
preferences. Litigants thus have a reasonable guess
about the Court’s preferences, but this guess is sub-
ject to error (Litigant Assumption 2). If, in Figure 4,
Party B believes that the Supreme Court’s preferred
legal rule is quite conservative and located at XSC , it
will appeal. But, if the Supreme Court’s preferred
legal rule is, in fact, located at the less conservative
~XSC , Party B will have estimated incorrectly and thus
lose on the merits; the Supreme Court would affirm
the lower court’s decision.4 As we explain below,
these incorrect estimates by litigants are crucial to our
theory.
In choosing to appeal to the Supreme Court,
there are different types of mistakes that a litigant can
make. To see this, consider a petitioner who would
benefit from a more conservative legal rule—that is, a
petitioner who would like to secure a legal rule
sufficiently to the right of the lower court decision
to result in a reversal of the lower court’s judgment.
The petitioner believes that the case facts place the
lower court ruling on the wrong side of the Supreme
Court’s preferred ruling and therefore appeals. What
are the potential outcomes of this appeal? Figure 5
illustrates the possibilities. Suppose that (contrary to
the petitioner’s beliefs) XSC—the Court’s preferred
rule—is located to the left of DLC . If the Court grants
cert and decides the case, it will issue a ‘‘liberal
affirmance’’ by affirming the lower court decision
against a petitioner who has argued in favor of a
more conservative legal rule.
A second type of mistake occurs if XSC is located
in the interval between DLC and c. In this case,
depicted at the center of Figure 5, the petitioner has
correctly perceived that the Supreme Court—like the
petitioner—favors a more conservative legal rule than
the one embodied in the lower court decision. How-
ever, the petitioner has overestimated how conserva-
tive the Supreme Court is. Although the Court wants
to move policy to the right, it is not so conservative
as to arrive at a judgment different from that of
the lower court—at least in terms of the party that
should win the case. If the Court accepts such a case
for plenary review, it will adopt a more conservative
legal rule than the lower court, but the decisional
outcome will be an affirmance of the lower court’s
judgment. As before, such an appeal would result in a
‘‘liberal affirmance.’’ Importantly, this type of mis-
take is less severe than the first; the petitioner has at
least correctly perceived the ideological direction of
the Supreme Court’s preferences relative to the lower
court. He has merely overestimated the Court’s level
of conservatism. Because such a mistake is easier to
make than the first, it should occur more frequently
than the first.
Figure 6 illustrates the same dynamic for peti-
tioners who would benefit from a more liberal legal
rule than the one adopted by the lower court. The
case facts (c) must be located to the left of the lower
court decision at DLC (otherwise, the petitioner could
not benefit from a more liberal legal rule). Because
she has chosen to appeal, the petitioner must believe
that the Supreme Court favors a legal rule to the left
of c. If she is correct, the Court issues a ‘‘liberal
reversal.’’ If the petitioner has estimated incorrectly,
the Court issues a ‘‘conservative affirmance.’’ Once
again, mistakes in which the petitioner correctly
estimates the direction of the Supreme Court’s
preferences but overestimates the Supreme Court’s
liberalness should be more frequent than mistakes in
which the petitioner appeals to a Supreme Court that
is more conservative than the lower court.
Empirical Implications for the
Ideological Content of Supreme
Court ‘‘Output’’
Figures 5 and 6 illustrate four logically possible
Supreme Court ‘‘outcomes’’ if the ideological content
of a decision is coded from the direction of the
Supreme Court’s judgment (i.e., whether the Court
favors the conservative or liberal side of a dispute):
Conservative Reversals, Liberal Reversals, Conservative
Affirmances, and Liberal Affirmances. Reversals occur
when a petitioner correctly estimates the position of
the Supreme Court, and affirmances result when the
FIGURE 4 Litigant Decision Making
4A reasonable question is why the Supreme Court would have
taken the case for decision in the first place. Within our model,
there are two possible reasons. First, the Supreme Court may
perceive the difference between the legal rule established by the
lower court and its own preferred rule to be sufficiently
significant to take the case and move policy to ~XSC , even if it
agrees with the lower court on which party should prevail.
Alternatively, the justices may have (erroneously) perceived that
they disagreed with the lower court’s disposition at the cert stage
(see Supreme Court assumption 3).
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petitioner assesses the Supreme Court’s position
incorrectly. Are any of these outcomes more likely
than the others? In light of our assumptions, we can
draw several general conclusions.
Implication 1: Petitioners should win significantly
more often than they lose.
Since petitioners are likely to have a reasonable
estimate of the Court’s ideological location, we expect
that their estimate of the Court’s position is more
often correct than it is mistaken. Moreover, in
granting cert, the justices are primarily motivated
by a desire to ‘‘correct’’ lower court errors; that is,
they are more likely to grant cert to a petition
challenging a lower court decision they are inclined
to reverse. Thus, the ‘‘pool’’ of cases from which the
justices select cases to decide on the merits is biased
towards cases in which the Court is likely to reverse.
Implication 2: When petitioners lose, it is more likely
that they have overestimated the intensity
of Supreme Court preferences than that they
have miscalculated the direction of the Court’s
preferences.
When the Supreme Court affirms a lower court
decision, it is because the petitioner has made a
‘‘mistake’’; she has brought the case to the Court on
the incorrect impression that the Supreme Court
prefers a judgment in her favor to the lower court’s
decision. As we outlined above, there are two ways in
which such mistakes can occur. One possibility is that,
although the petitioner correctly estimates that the
Court agrees with her on the direction in which the
legal rule ought to be moved (e.g., both believe that
more intrusive searches should be permissible under
the Fourth Amendment), she does not realize that the
Court’s preferences are not sufficiently intense to
result in a reversal (e.g., the petitioner believes that
highly intrusive searches should be permitted, while
the Court favors only moderately intrusive searches).
The other error petitioners can make is to believe
that the Supreme Court’s preferred legal rule is located
on the same side of a case fact as the petitioner relative
to the lower court, when the Court’s preferred legal
rule is on the opposite side. Under such circumstances,
the Court is inclined to move legal policy in precisely
the opposite direction of that preferred by the peti-
tioner. For instance, suppose that the petitioner
believes the Court favors permitting highly intrusive
searches, when in fact it favors placing severe restric-
tions on intrusive searches. Under this scenario, the
petitioner has not only misidentified the intensity of
FIGURE 5 Conservative Litigant Mistakes
FIGURE 6 Liberal Litigant Mistakes
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the Court’s preferences, but the direction: while the
petitioner believed that the Court prefers a more
conservative policy, the Court actually prefers a more
liberal one.
Although the latter cases can and do arise, we
believe that they should be rare, because they require
the most serious errors in judgment on the part of the
petitioner. Such cases require the petitioner to mis-
understand not simply how conservative or liberal
the Supreme Court is. Instead, the petitioner must
completely misunderstand the ideological direction
in which the Court would prefer to move legal policy.
We expect these ‘‘larger’’ mistakes to occur much less
frequently than the ‘‘small’’ ones. In other words,
cases in which the petitioner has mistaken the
direction in which the Court would like to move
legal policy should constitute only a small fraction of
the Court’s plenary docket.
The exact degree of the litigants’ accuracy—that
is, the precise frequencies with which they make
correct v. incorrect estimates—does not figure in
our model. For our purposes, we need only assume
that, regardless of whether they prefer to move legal
policy to the left or to the right, litigants have the
same information, the same ability to formulate an
estimate of the Supreme Court’s location, and the
same likelihood, on average, of petitioning the Court
in light of such considerations. Given these general
expectations, we can now consider subtler influences
on the balance of types of decisions issued as the
Supreme Court’s ideology changes over time.
A Centrist Supreme Court. Suppose the Supreme
Court occupies a centrist position (i.e., a majority
of justices would prefer to adopt legal rules that fall
close to the center of the preference distribution of
the lower courts).5 Given our assumptions (and the
assumption that lower-court preferences are approx-
imately normally distributed), lower court decisions
should fall in roughly equal number and at similar
distances to the right and to the left of the Supreme
Court. As illustrated in Figure 7, some lower courts
will be bolder in their deviations from the Supreme
Court’s preferred policy; others, more timid. Given
that the distribution of lower court preferences is
symmetric about the Supreme Court’s position at
XSC, these deviations should be roughly equal on
either side of the Court’s preferred rule. Lower court
decisions that fall to the right will tend to be appealed
by petitioners who favor a more liberal legal rule
and lower court decisions that fall to the left will tend
to be appealed by petitioners who favor a more con-
servative legal rule. In general, both types of peti-
tioners will be ‘‘accurate’’ about the Supreme Court’s
preferences most of the time. Some, of course, will
make mistakes, but there is no reason to think that
one group or the other will be more susceptible to
making such errors.
What would we see if we were to look at the
aggregate composition of the Court’s opinions as
measured by the direction of the Court’s decisions?
Overall, there should be more reversals than affir-
mances (see Implication 1). Because roughly an equal
number of lower court decisions fall to the right and
the left of the Supreme Court’s preferred policy, we
expect a rough balance of ‘‘liberal’’ and ‘‘conserva-
tive’’ reversals (see Figure 5 and Figure 6). Among
affirmances, we should see the same pattern: because
liberal and conservative petitioners make mistakes at
roughly the same rate, we expect to observe about the
same number of ‘‘liberal’’ affirmances as ‘‘conserva-
tive’’ affirmances. The aggregate consequence of these
outcomes should be an approximate ideological
balance across the types of decisions issued by the
Court: there should be about as many ‘‘conservative’’
as ‘‘liberal’’ decisions, which, after all, is what one
would expect from a centrist Supreme Court.
A Conservative Supreme Court. Now, suppose
that, through the replacement of one or more jus-
tices, the Supreme Court becomes more conservative
relative to lower courts (i.e., in Figure 7, the Supreme
Court’s most preferred legal rule moves to the right
relative to the distribution of lower court preferen-
ces). A critical consequence of this movement is that
a preponderance of lower court decisions will now be
located to the Supreme Court’s left. This is true
because, given our assumptions, lower courts are
FIGURE 7 Position of Supreme Court Relative to
Lower Courts
5While it is possible to think about the ideological position of a
political actor in reference to some absolute scale, it typically
makes more sense to think of preferences in relation to the
political context. Thus, a ‘‘conservative’’ Supreme Court is
conservative precisely because it is more conservative than most
other actors in the political system. In discussing Supreme Court
ideology, we thus consider the Court’s ideology relative to the
ideological distribution of lower courts.
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likely to take note of the Supreme Court’s ‘‘shift’’ and
adjust their decisions by ‘‘following’’ the Court to the
right. But, they do so only to the extent they perceive
necessary in order to avoid Supreme Court reversal.
Because most lower courts will now prefer legal rules
that are more liberal than those preferred by the
newly conservative Supreme Court, these courts will
exploit whatever ‘‘slack’’ they believe they have to
issue decisions that deviate to the left of the Supreme
Court’s preferred policy. Lower courts to the right of
the Court, by contrast, have less need to deviate, since
the Court’s shift in preferences has brought the Court
closer to their own preferences. Because these devia-
tions are greater to the left of the Court than to the
right, petitioners who would benefit from a more
conservative legal rule have a greater chance of
securing review from the Court and prevailing on
the merits. Thus, petitions seeking conservative pol-
icies will predominate for two reasons: There are
more lower court decisions to the Court’s left than to
its right, and these decisions are more likely to be
granted cert by the Supreme Court.
Regardless of whether they seek conservative or
liberal legal rules, rational petitioners generally ‘‘guess
right’’ about the Supreme Court’s own preferred
standard and thereby secure reversals. Because peti-
tioners seeking conservative policy outcomes (i.e., the
cases represented by Figure 5) now command a larger
share of the Court’s plenary docket than those
seeking liberal legal change (i.e., the cases represented
by Figure 6), the number of conservative reversals
increases relative to the number of liberal reversals.
So, as the Court has moved to the right, the ideolog-
ical composition of the Court’s output as measured
by reversals also shifts in a conservative direction, ex-
actly as one would expect; a more conservative Court
produces a larger number of conservative reversals
than liberal reversals.
Now consider cases in which petitioners have
made a mistake, those in which the Court affirms the
lower court’s decision. Because most of the significant
deviations from the Court’s preferred rule—that is, the
cases the Court is mostly likely to review—are located
to the left of the Court, petitioners who challenge those
deviations will be responsible for a larger share of
‘‘correct guesses’’ (i.e., conservative reversals) and a
larger share of ‘‘incorrect guesses’’ (i.e., liberal affir-
mances). This implies that liberal affirmances will
outweigh conservative affirmances. Ironically, a more
conservative Court will produce more liberal affirman-
ces than conservative affirmances.
Because reversals are more common than affir-
mances, as the Supreme Court shifts to the right, the
ideological direction of its decisions—taken in the
aggregate—is likely to reflect a shift in a conservative
direction; most of the Court’s decisions will be re-
versals, and most of those reversals will be conserva-
tive. But this aggregation hides an important twist:
although a shift to the right by the Court leads to an
increase in the number of conservative decisions
among reversals, the exact opposite is likely to
be true in cases in which the Court affirms; as the
Court shifts to the right, the number of liberal af-




The central implication of the foregoing argument is
that the common directional measure of Supreme
Court outputs will be misleading when applied to
decisions to affirm. The reason is that, although
litigants who wish to move policy in the same direction
preferred by the Court will appeal more often and offer
the Court more credible cases for certiorari, they will
be responsible for larger shares of both reversals
(which should reflect the Court’s preferences) and
affirmances (which should run contrary to them).
As we demonstrate in the next section, this
conclusion has significant implications for the conven-
tional directional measure of Supreme Court outputs.
Our evidence indicates that any aggregate ideological
measure that combines affirmances and reversals
merges two sets of case outcomes that move in
decidedly different ideological directions. Thus, includ-
ing affirmances—which, as we show, run increasingly
counter to the true underlying ideological position
of the Court as it moves towards one or the other end
of the ideological spectrum relative to the lower
courts—introduces systematic bias in this measure.
Empirical Support
If our argument is correct, a counterintuitive
empirical implication follows:
Implication: As the Supreme Court moves to the
right relative to the lower courts, its output as
measured by the ideological direction of decisions
will become more conservative in reversals and more
liberal in affirmances. Conversely, as the Court
moves left relative to the lower courts, its output
as measured by the ideological direction of decisions
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will become more liberal in reversals and more
conservative in affirmances.
In this section, we offer evidence in support of this
implication. Using data from the U.S. Supreme Court
Judicial Database, we examine annual liberalism in
terms of outputs, differentiating between rever-
sals and affirmances. We expect reversals to reflect
changes in the Court’s preferences over time and
affirmances to run counter to them. Testing our
expectation—which depends on the preferences of
the Supreme Court relative to the lower courts—
requires a measure of the relative ideological distance
between the Supreme Court and the lower courts.
Just how liberal or conservative is the Supreme Court
compared to lower courts? Generating data on the
preferences of the members of the Supreme Court has
long been problematic, and finding comparable data
for lower court judges is an even more difficult task.
While sophisticated measures of the justices’ prefer-
ences have been developed (e.g., Martin and Quinn
2002), these typically do not allow us to compare
across the Supreme Court and lower courts.
To deal with this difficulty, we construct a
measure of the preferences of the Supreme Court
relative to the lower courts by focusing on a proxy
that has the advantage of being available for both
the Supreme Court and the Courts of Appeals: the
party affiliation of the judges’ appointing president.
We measure the relative preferences of the Supreme
Court as the difference in the percentage of Supreme
Court justices and Court of Appeals judges appointed
by Democratic presidents. The larger this difference,
the more liberal the Supreme Court, relative to the
lower courts.6 In an ideal world, of course, we would
have similar estimates for judges on state courts.
Unfortunately, federalism frustrates such an effort,7
and we therefore focus on cases in which the
Supreme Court reviewed the decision of a federal
appellate court.
Aggregate Analysis
Figure 8 provides a rough first cut at our implication:
it plots our measure of relative Supreme Court
preferences, and the annual liberalism of Supreme
Court outputs, broken down by reversals and affir-
mances.8 These data confirm our theoretical expec-
tations; the two time series for reversals and
affirmances clearly run counter to one another.9 Both
are measures of annual liberalism, differing only by
whether the Court reversed or affirmed the lower
court, and yet they are negatively correlated (r 5
–.42, p , .002). Moreover, as expected, the series for
reversals closely follows the measure of how liberal
the Court is relative to lower courts: when the Court
moves rightward relative to the courts of appeals, its
outputs are more conservative, while a Court that is
more liberal than its lower court counterparts gen-
erates more liberal policy (r 5 .79, p , .001). By
contrast, the comparable series for affirmances reveals
the opposite trend; although it is counterintuitive to
observe a more conservative Court producing more
liberal policy outcomes (r 5 –.42, p , .002), it is
precisely what our theory predicts.
Although Figure 8 is suggestive, we can be more
systematic in evaluating the implication of our argu-
ment. Our theory implies that, as the Supreme Court
moves relative to the lower courts, the Court’s out-
puts in reversals will reflect the Court’s preferences,
and the output in affirmances will run counter to
them. Thus, our measure of Supreme Court’s pref-
erences should correctly predict the ideological direc-
tion of the Court’s output in reversals, but it should
have a negative relationship with the ideology of
outputs in affirmances. Table 1 reports these results.
For each OLS model, the dependent variable is the
6We use this measure because it provides an estimate of relative
preferences on which our argument focuses. It is worth noting,
however, that the Supreme Court’s absolute preferences could be
used in lieu of relative preferences. After all, although the partisan
composition of the both Supreme Court and Courts of Appeals
should be correlated over time, the much larger number of
federal appellate judges ensures that Court of Appeals preferences
will not move as dramatically in ideological space over time as
those of the Supreme Court. So, these relative preferences are
likely to correlate with absolute preferences. Indeed, conducting
our analysis with such a measure—we use the widely adopted
Segal-Cover (1989) scores—yields substantively similar results.
These results appear in the appendix.
7There are important variations in the selection mechanisms for
the judges on state supreme courts. Thus, although a great many
state judges do serve under a party label, a substantial number do
not.
8To classify outcomes as reversals or affirmances, we rely upon
the ‘‘WIN’’ variable in the U.S. Supreme Court Judicial Database.
This variable measures which party prevailed, the petitioner or
the respondent, and it may generally be interpreted as a
simplified version of the ‘‘DIS’’ variable, which takes account
of the Court’s specific order (e.g., affirm, reverse, vacate and
remand, affirmed in part and reversed in part, dismissed).
9To underscore visually the important variation, we smooth each
time series to a uniformly weighted moving average, calculated
using the values for two previous terms, the current term, and
three future terms. We then center them by standardizing each to
a mean of zero and standard deviation of one. Note, though, that
the correlation coefficients we report are derived from the
original, unsmoothed series.
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annual percentage of cases decided in a liberal
direction.10
Our independent variable is the Supreme Court’s
preferences, measured as the Court’s ideology rela-
tive to the ideology of the federal appellate courts.
(To check the robustness of our results, we also
test our models utilizing a conventional measure of
the Court’s preferences—the Segal-Cover [1989]
scores—and these results are presented and discussed
in the appendix.) In addition, we include a lag of the
dependent variable as a corrective for first-order
autocorrelation. We employ three different versions
of the dependent variable—liberalism as measured
by reversals, affirmances, and both types of cases
combined.
Model 1, which relies on the standard construc-
tion of the dependent variable, combines reversals
and affirmances in measuring the ideological direc-
tion of the Court’s outputs. As expected, the distance
between justices’ preferences and those of the lower
courts is a strong predictor of the Court’s liberalism.
Though the magnitude of this variable’s impact and
its substantive interpretation are interesting in their
own right, this coefficient and the model from which
it is derived are for us a useful baseline against which
to evaluate other specifications.11
Model 2 represents the first test of our theory,
measuring liberalism as captured by reversals only.
As expected, the coefficient for the ideological dis-
tance between the justices and lower-court judges is
positive. Indeed, the estimate associated with this
variable is almost twice as large after affirmances are
jettisoned, increasing from .52 in the first equation to
.87 in the second. If we shift our focus to affirmances,
we should observe a contrary result, and Model 4
confirms this expectation. The coefficient for the
preference measure for the Supreme Court is signifi-
cant and negative. For affirmances, the measure
suggests that as the Court moves in a conservative di-
rection, it generates more liberal policy decisions—
clearly a nonsensical result.
Models 3 and 5 provide an additional robustness
check. Some accounts of Supreme Court decision
making suggest that the decision to affirm might be a
by-product of having to resolve conflicts among the
lower courts (see, e.g., Segal and Spaeth 2002, 262–65).
If the justices grant certiorari to cases that present
conflict because of their institutional responsibility
to unify federal law, not necessarily as a means of
advancing their policy goals, then the cases that
involve conflict among lower courts may undercut
our observation of the ‘‘error correction’’ strategy
that is assumed by our model. So, if we eliminate
these cases from our analysis, the estimates for the
Court’s policy preferences should become larger in
both equations. Accordingly, we recalculated our
annual time series for reversals and affirmances,
excluding all cases in which the majority opinion
FIGURE 8 Relative Supreme Court Preferences and Supreme Court Liberalism in
Reverals and Affirmances
10The unit of analysis is docket number, including split votes, for
all orally argued cases from the federal courts of appeals decided
by full opinion for the 1953–2004 Terms.
11Readers interested in the magnitude of the effect of the Court’s
preferences and how it varies between models will find the
appendix especially useful.
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cited some type of conflict as a reason for granting
review.12 As expected, excluding cases involving
conflict enhances the predictive power of both
models and the size of their coefficients, especially
in the model for affirmances. Indeed, the coefficient
for the justices’ preferences increases from –.44 to
–.81, an almost two-fold increase in the estimate for
that variable from the first affirmance equation.
Reversals also evince a healthy improvement, increas-
ing from .87 to .94, when conflict cases are excluded.
(Note, though, that any such comparisons between
models must necessarily be made with caution,
since the dependent variable is different in each
equation.)
In short, our analysis of the Court’s aggregate
outputs provides powerful evidence consistent with
our argument. The preferences of the Court are
reflected in the Court’s outputs when we consider
reversals; but affirmances run counter to the Court’s
preferences, as the Court diverges more and more
from the lower courts. Thus, including affirmances in
a measure of the ideological direction of the Court’s
outputs introduces systematic bias.
Moving to the Individual Level
Although our argument is aimed at measures of the
ideological content of Supreme Court decisions, it
also has implications for the voting behavior of
individual justices. After all, both lower courts and
litigants make decisions based upon their estimate of
the Supreme Court’s ‘‘preferred legal rule’’ and that
estimate is derived from observations and beliefs
about its individual members. Thus, the dynamics
we identify for the Court as a whole should be present
in the voting behavior of justices whose preferences
are close to the policies that the Court as a whole is
likely to adopt. The justices who are most likely to
reflect the Court’s preferred legal rule are at the
ideological center of the Court. Since these justices so
often control the outcomes of cases, their preferences
on any given issue are thus a proxy for the legal rule
preferred by the Court. Lower courts should adjust
their policies in light of the ideological center of the
Court. Likewise, the tendency for litigants to ‘‘guess
right’’—as well as make mistakes—regarding the
Court’s preferences should be keyed to the centrist
justices. As a result, the pattern we observe at the
aggregate level should be present in their voting
records; votes to reverse should track their ideology;
votes to affirm should run counter to them.
In contrast, the same is not true of justices on the
ideological wings of the Court. Whatever that level of
uncertainty when estimating the Court’s (i.e., the
centrist justices’) preferred legal rule, it is becomes
progressively less the farther a justice is from the
Court’s center. Stated differently, regardless of whether
they vote to reverse or to affirm the lower court, the
justices at either end of the ideological spectrum will
TABLE 1 Models of Annual Liberalism on the Supreme Court, 1953–2004
Variable
All Cases Reversals Only Affirmances Only
All Cases Conflict excluded All Cases Conflict excluded
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Supreme Court
Preferences
.52* (.13) .87* (.18) .94* (.21) 2.44* (.15) 2.81* (.21)
Dynamics (Yt21) .23 (.13) .35* (.12) .35* (.12) .01 (.14) 2.02 (.14)
Constant .48 (.08) .49 (.09) .48 (.09) .40 (.06) .34 (.06)
R-Squared .51 .74 .68 .18 .30
Note: N 5 51. Dependent variable is the annual percentage of cases decided in a liberal direction. The Supreme Court’s Preferences are
relative preferences, measured as the percentage of Supreme Court justices appointed by a Democratic president minus that same
percentage for judges on the U.S. Courts of Appeals. These same models, using the Court’s absolute preferences appear in the appendix.
Numbers in parentheses are standard errors; *p , .01.
12So, for example, we exclude all cases where, according to the
Supreme Court Database, the Court’s reasons for granting certiorari
included such considerations as conflict between or among
circuits and confusion or uncertainty among federal or state
courts. Prior to Congress eliminating virtually all appeals in 1988,
cases that came to the Court via the writ of appeal were, in theory
at least, nondiscretionary. The Court, however, has long treated
appeals as discretionary (Perry 1991). So, we include them in our
aggregate calculations. Because the Supreme Court Database does
not take account of the reason for granting review in appeals,
though, we cannot say which appeals present conflict. We
therefore exclude them from our calculations for the time series
in which there was no conflict. This choice has no invidious
implications for any of our inferences, however. Our results look
substantially the same when appeals are included.
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vote in ways that reflect their ideology. For that
reason, it does not matter whether a litigant is
correct in estimating that the Court will move legal
policy, say, to the right in a given case, since the most
conservative justices will still likely vote conserva-
tively (i.e., to reverse), just as the most liberal justices
will still likely vote liberally (i.e., to affirm); that is,
we expect little divergence between the two types of
votes. This line of argument thus yields a testable
implication:
Implication: For justices close to the center of the
Court, liberalism as measured by the direction of
individual votes to reverse should track a justice’s
ideology. Liberalism as measured by votes to affirm
should run counter to the justice’s ideology. For
justices located away from the Court’s center, lib-
eralism as measured by individual votes to reverse
and votes to affirm should track a justice’s ideology
equally well, especially for justices located at the
Court’s extremes.
To test this hypothesis, for each term from 1953 to
2004, we first rank-order the justices by their ideo-
logical distance from the Court’s median justice (as
measured by Segal-Cover scores). We then separate
the justices into three, roughly equal-sized groups.
The three justices closest to the center of the Court
(Group 1), the three justices at intermediate distance
from the center (Group 2), and the three justices who
are furthest from the median (Group 3).13 Our
hypothesis leads us to expect that for justices in
Group 1, ideology correctly predicts liberalism as
measured by votes to reverse, but that liberalism in
votes to affirm will run counter to ideology. For jus-
tices in Group 2, ideology will correctly predict liber-
alism in votes to reverse. For votes to affirm, ideology
will either run counter to liberalism in votes, or it
will predict liberalism poorly. Finally, for justices in
Group 3, the difference between liberalism in votes to
affirm and votes to reverse should vanish—ideology
will predict liberalism equally well for each type of
vote. Table 2 presents these results.
The results are clear. Consider the center group
of justices first. When we restrict attention to lib-
eralism as measured in votes to reverse, liberalism
tracks ideology well. As justices become more liberal
according to their Segal-Cover scores, their rate of
liberalism increases significantly. The picture changes
dramatically in votes to affirm; the estimated coef-
ficient is negative and significant. For justices in the
center of the court, their voting behavior appears to
become more conservative as the justice becomes
more liberal—a result that follows directly from our
argument. Now consider the group of justices located
at an intermediate distance from the Court’s center.
As expected for these justices, liberalism in votes to
reverse tracks ideology well. But for votes to affirm,
there is virtually no relationship between the justice’s
ideology and the measured ideological content of
their votes; the estimated coefficient is close to zero
and insignificant, and the R-squared of the regression
is negligible. Finally, consider the justices at furthest
remove from the Court’s center. For these justices,
there is little distinction between liberalism in votes
to affirm and votes to reverse.
These individual level results provide unambig-
uous support for our argument.14 For justices at the
extremes of the Court, ideology predicts the justices’
votes, regardless of whether they happen to be votes
to reverse or votes to affirm. However, as we move
towards the center of the Court—the gravitational
force for lower courts and the strategic target for
petitioning litigants—the ideology of the justices
begins to run counter to the ideological direction of
their voting behavior as measured in votes to affirm.
Just as in the aggregate results, it is evident that the
inclusion of votes to affirm—for the theoretical
reasons outlined above—introduces systematic bias
into the simple, directional measure of the ideological
output of judicial decisions.
An Analytic Prescription
To this point, we have documented the marked
differences that manifest themselves in ideological
measures of the Court’s (and justices’) output when
we disaggregate decisions into decisions that (and
votes to) reverse and affirm lower court decisions.
These differences—not previously contemplated by
scholars of the Court—are dramatic, revealing that
the ideological direction of decisions to reverse
13Because there are occasionally ‘‘ties’’ in the distance from the
median of different justices, it is not possible to achieve a
perfectly even division—justices at the same distance must be
assigned to the same group. However, the results we report below
are robust to different methods of breaking this tie (i.e., assigning
all to the lower category, or assigning all to the higher category).
The results are also robust to a specification that uses continuous
distance from the median and interacts that measure with the
justices’ preferences.
14Because Segal-Cover scores are exogenous to the voting record
of justices on the Court, we prefer this measure of ideology for
the current analysis. However, substantively similar results
emerge if we use Martin-Quinn scores to conduct the analysis.
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conforms to our expectations about the linkage
between ideology and behavior and that the direction
of decisions to affirm runs counter to them. What,
then, is the corrective? Our recommendation is that
analyses of the Supreme Court that use the direction
of the Court’s decision as a proxy for the ideological
position of an opinion should rely upon decisions (or
votes) to reverse as the appropriate set of decisions
(or votes) from which to generalize. We should note
that this is a corrective that is independent of other
transformations and indeed should precede these. For
example, in an influential article, Baum (1988) de-
veloped a method for correcting for changes in the
content of the Court’s docket over time. To do so, he
examined the median change in liberal voting for the
justices who served from one term to the next and
attributed such change to the different character of
the cases on the docket at different points in time
(i.e., that cases were becoming ‘‘harder’’ or ‘‘easier’’
to decide in a liberal direction.) Because this method
relies upon votes to affirm as well as votes to reverse,
it necessarily includes data that we believe frustrate
attempts to gauge the content of the Court’s caseload
and the policies that emanate from it. Moreover,
Baum was specifically interested in comparing
changes in liberalism over time. As we have shown,
however, the inclusion of votes to affirm contami-
nates cross-sectional inferences, as well. Thus, our
recommended corrective has more general implica-
tions that transcend analyses such as those under-
taken by Baum. Any analysis that includes the
ideological direction of votes or decisions to affirm
relies upon invalid indicators.
Because it surely seems strange to suggest that
scholars should ‘‘throw out’’—or at least ‘‘treat
separately’’—a large number of decisions, it is im-
portant to be clear about the nature of our claim. We
are not claiming that decisions in which the Court
affirms a lower court are unaffected by ideological
considerations. Nor are we saying that the content of
opinions in those cases cannot be meaningfully
placed in ideological space. Rather, our claim is
conditional. If the ideological direction of the Su-
preme Court’s decision is taken as a proxy for the
ideological content of the decision—an approach that
is widespread among judicial scholars—then affir-
mances should be excluded because they are likely to
introduce systematic bias into this particular proxy
measure. Indeed, we suspect that prior research has
succeeded in connecting the Court’s preferences to
votes despite this systematic bias only because votes
to reverse are simply more common than votes to
affirm and thus overwhelm the distorting influence of
including affirmances.
It is easiest to illustrate the potential significance
of this prescription for statistical inferences through
an example. To do so, we revisit the enduring
controversy over the impact of public opinion on
decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court. Although a
number of scholarly studies have investigated this
linkage, one of the most important is a debate
published in 1994 in the American Political Science
Review. The previous year, William Mishler and
Reginald Sheehan (1993) reported evidence of the
Court’s responsiveness to public preferences. Skep-
tical of this result, Helmut Norpoth and Jeffrey Segal
(1994) observed that these scholars had not taken
account of the dramatic realignment in the Court’s
preferences that occurred between the liberal Warren
Court and the conservative Burger Court. Moreover,
Norpoth and Segal noted, when Mishler and Sheehan
did control for the Court’s preferences, they had
assessed the impact of the Court’s ideological com-
position from the previous year, rather than its
TABLE 2 Annual Liberalism of Justices by Distance from Center, 1953–2004
Variable















.73* (.09) 2.33* (.13) .62* (.08) 2.03 (.08) .28* (.07) .44* (.08)
Constant .22 (.05) .68 (.07) .22 (.06) .45 (.06) .39 (.06) .25 (.05)
R-Squared .58 .14 .56 .00 .22 .39
N 166 166 151 151 152 152
Note: Distance from the center is measured as the absolute value of each justice’s deviation from the median justice’s Segal/Cover score.
Dependent variables are the annual percentage of liberal votes in votes to affirm and the annual percentage of liberal votes in votes to
reverse, based on federal cert cases involving no conflict. Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors, clustered by justice;
*p , .05.
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composition at the time of its decisions. By taking
into account the large Warren-to-Burger shift or by
controlling for the Court’s preferences at the time of
the justices’ decisions, Norpoth and Segal demon-
strated that the direct effect of public opinion
disappeared.
Our aim here is not to reopen this debate; we do
not challenge the results of Norpoth and Segal.
Instead, we simply explore what they might have
found had our analytic prescription been employed
in their analysis. In replicating their results, we rely
upon the same variables calculated over the same
time period, 1956–89, and estimate the models with
identical procedures. (We do make one alteration.
In their exchange, Norpoth and Segal differed with
Mishler and Sheehan as to how long it might take the
justices to respond to changes in public preferences.
Stated empirically, the issue was whether—and to
what degree—the measure of public opinion should
be lagged in statistical models. Rather than try to
resolve this issue, we construct what we think is the
most strenuous test of public opinion’s effect by
requiring the contemporaneous impact of public
opinion to compete with the Court’s preferences for
explanatory power.15)
We begin by reestimating the two equations most
central to their analysis.16 The first models the
Court’s annual liberalism as a function of current
public mood and the pronounced shift in the Court’s
policy orientation brought about by the Nixon
appointees. The second replaces the Warren Court/
Burger-Rehnquist Courts dummy variable with a
more continuous measure of the justices’ preferences,
the sum of the justices’ ideological scores as measured
by Segal and Cover (1989). These results appear in
the first two columns of Table 3. This exercise
confirms the findings of Norpoth and Segal; the
relevant coefficients are more or less indistinguish-
able from those that they reported, and the story they
impart is same: the Court’s preferences determine the
direction of the Court’s aggregate policymaking and
public opinion does not.
Next, we vary their specification only by elimi-
nating affirmances from our estimate of the Court’s
annual liberalism. By calculating the Court’s policy
outputs by what we regard as the more valid
indicator (i.e., reversals), a very different empirical
picture emerges. According to the results in the third
and fourth columns in Table 3, not only does public
opinion exercise a statistically significant effect, but
the impact of the Court’s preferences also increases.
By eliminating the distortion introduced by including
affirmances, we uncover a clear linkage between
public mood and the justices’ policies. At the same
time, the increase in the coefficients measuring the
Court’s attitudes confirms that there are no trade-offs
between the Court’s and the public’s preferences; not
only does the effect of public opinion increase in our
alternative models, but the justices’ policy orienta-
tions likewise have an even more pronounced con-
nection to the Court’s decision making.
Seen in this way, we have not crafted a strategy to
maximize the impact of one variable at the expense of
another. Rather, by relying upon a more valid
indicator of the Court’s policies, we can better
illuminate the underlying impact of a variety of
competing explanations. That our modeling strategy
provides such clarity on an issue that has generated so
much disagreement is, we think, a strong test of our
theory.
Implications and Conclusions
Empirical measures of the ideological content of
Supreme Court outputs are central to much of the
scholarly work on judicial behavior and on the in-
teractions between the Supreme Court and the other
parts of the political system. The most commonly
used measure makes use of the direction of the
Court’s judgment—that is, whether the ‘‘liberal’’ or
‘‘conservative’’ side in a dispute prevails—as a proxy
for the ideological content of the underlying policy
output or rule of a decision. The ideological content
of the Court’s output or of a particular justice’s
voting record can then be estimated by the propor-
tion of liberal (or conservative) decisions. Here, we
have developed a theoretical argument that suggests
that this conventional measure suffers from a system-
atic bias that can confuse inferences about the Court’s
decision making. Specifically, as the Supreme Court’s
preferences change relative to the preferences of
15According to Norpoth and Segal, who doubt the effects of
public opinion, no matter how many lags of public opinion are
employed, the justices would always have to evaluate past
opinion relative to current opinion, and thus, if public opinion
matters, the analyst should always find evidence of its contem-
poraneous effects (1994, 712).
16We are grateful to William Mishler for providing us with a copy
of their original data. These same data were also used by Norpoth
and Segal in their analysis. To facilitate comparison to our
alternative models, we recalculated their measure of annual
liberalism and then calculated a comparable series after dropping
all the decisions to affirm the lower court. There is nothing
invidious in our reestimation of the original time series; indeed,
our measure of this series is virtually identical to Mishler and
Sheehan’s (r 5 .97).
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lower courts, the ideological direction of decisions
to affirm will systematically run counter to the
known preferences of the justices and the ideological
content of the policies or rules adopted in decisions.
By including such cases in their analysis, scholars
thus run the risk of introducing an ‘‘affirmance
bias’’ that can adversely affect their conclusions.
We have also presented an empirical evaluation
of the aggregate outputs of the Court and of the
individual voting behavior of justices that provides
strong support for our argument. Importantly, rep-
lication of a prominent study of the effects of public
opinion and judicial preferences on the Court’s
outputs demonstrates that the consequences of af-
firmance bias can be severe. Overcoming this evi-
dence would require an alternative, compelling
explanation that can account for why a large set of
decisions—affirmances—fails so spectacularly as a
valid indicator of the Court’s policy outputs.
Most statistical analyses of the Court routinely
include affirmances in the analysis. Our results sug-
gest that for research that involves the ideological
content of Supreme Court output as measured by the
ideological direction of the Court’s decisions—
either as a dependent or an independent variable—
doing so can be costly. Our results demonstrate, for
example, that the impact of the justices’ preferences
is even greater than the staunchest adherents of the
attitudinal model have demonstrated. At the same
time, the significant explanatory power of other
variables of interest may have long been obscured
by the ‘‘affirmance bias.’’ To the extent that mixing
together reversals and affirmances mutes or con-
founds analytic results—and we have offered sub-
stantial evidence that it will—the answers to many
research questions are likely to be affected: Is the
Court constrained by the ideological composition of
the elected branches? Does the voting behavior of
individual justices change over time? What impact
do the Court’s policies have on litigants, lower courts,
and interest groups? How do the Court’s policies
affect public opinion, and vice versa? Revisiting even
‘‘settled’’ questions by excluding affirmances from the
analysis may yield new and surprising answers
to these questions. At first glance, a prescription to
focus analysis only on decisions to reverse may seem
counterintuitive. Yet by improving the gauge of ju-
dicial behavior, doing so is likely to throw any num-
ber of issues into greater relief.
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Appendix
Quantitative analyses of Supreme Court decision
making often account for the preferences of the
justices, and the typical strategy is to model the
impact of the Court’s absolute preferences. The
argument we present focuses instead on the Supreme
Court’s preferences, relative to the Courts of Appeals.
This strategy may seem unique, but in fact any
TABLE 3 ‘‘Popular Influence on Supreme Court Decisions’’ American Political Science Review (1994),
Replication and Corrected Models
Variable Replication Models (all cases) Corrected Models (reversals only)
Public Mood(t) .22 (.27) .23 (.32) .76* (.24) .70* (.25)
Court realignment 217.82* (3.99) — 226.05* (3.23) —
Court composition(t) — 3.37* (.95) — 5.31* (.71)
Constant 37.88 (33.82) 20.77 (37.80) 217.44 (29.78) 234.29 (29.66)
AR(1) .08 (.18) .29 (.16) .03 (.21) .01 (.22)
Ljung-Box Q 9.99 14.20 7.11 15.53
Note: N 5 34. For replication models, dependent variable is the annual percentage of all case decided in a liberal direction. For
alternative models, dependent variable is the annual percentage of all reversals decided in a liberal direction. Court realignment is coded
as 0 for the years 1956–70 and as 1 thereafter. Public mood is the public’s overall liberalism as measured by the index of aggregated
survey items (Stimson 1991). The composition of the Court is the sum of the justices’ ideological scores, as measured by Segal and Cover
(1989). AR(1) is the autoregressive parameter. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors; *p , .01.
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statistical model that assesses the impact of the
Court’s preferences employs (at least implicitly) the
Court’s relative preferences. For example, to code
the Court’s ideology as ‘‘conservative’’ in an absolute
sense is only meaningful if, in other cases in the
model, the Court’s ideology takes on values to the left
of that position. In other words, what makes a
natural Court conservative is that it is conservative
relative to some other natural Court whose ideology
is somewhere to the left of its present position.
So, while most statistical models measure the Court’s
ideology with respect to time—‘‘How conservative is
the Court this term compared to last term?’’—we
model the Court’s ideology with respect to other
courts—‘‘How conservative is the Court compared to
the Courts of Appeals?’’
Our measurement strategy is driven by the need
to operationalize our theory. But our results are
hardly dependent upon our measure of preferences.
Barring massive and rapid attrition in the lower
courts, replacement on the Court is likely to move
the Court to the left or right relative to both its prior
ideology and the ideology of the lower courts. For
example, President Bush’s successive appointments of
Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito—fully 22% of
the Court—were not accompanied by a 22% turn-
over in the Courts of Appeals, and this had the effect
of moving the Court’s preferences to the right,
relative to both the current Courts of Appeals and
the Supreme Court’s previous ideology.
As an alternative strategy, we could have used an
absolute measure of the Court’s preferences and
specified, simply by assumption, that any ideological
change in the Court from one term to the next
moves the Court away from the preferences of the
mass of lower court judges. To illustrate this, we pro-
vide below the same models that appear in Table 1.
The only difference is that, instead of employing the
Supreme Court’s ideology compared to the lower
courts’ ideology, we measure the Supreme Court’s
preference as measured by the median Segal-Cover
(1989) ideological score. (We could also employ the
Martin-Quinn dynamic ideal points and again
produce similar results. Since these scores are based
upon votes, however, some might be concerned
about possible circularity problems.) Aside from
the expected differences in the coefficients between
the models, the results are stable and produce the
same inferences as those derived from Table 1.
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